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 NOTE 
American Greed: The Eleventh Circuit 
Analyzes Whether Booze, Babes, and 
Business Can Tightrope the Line Between 
Fraud and Deceit  
United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 3), 
modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016) 
Raymond Lee* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
South Beach, Miami, is renowned for its beautiful beaches, bikini-clad 
women, and incredible wealth.1  Such an environment is ripe for opportunistic 
businessmen who are anxious to make an easy buck.  Enter Albert Takhalov, 
Isaac Feldman, and Stanislav Pavlenko (the “Defendants”), three Russian im-
migrants who built a business model aimed precisely at taking advantage of the 
unique opportunities that South Beach has to offer.2  By combining seductive 
women with tourism and alcohol, their profits quickly began to soar.3  There 
was only one problem.  The crux of their plan involved misleading their pa-
trons.  While schemes to profit from unsuspecting customers are hardly a mod-
ern concept, at what point does merely deceiving a customer become “taking 
advantage” of him?  And at what point can a legitimate business model morph 
into a fraudulent criminal enterprise?  The gray area in the middle is where the 
law tends to get murky. 
Fraud itself is not defined anywhere in the federal criminal code.4  As 
courts across the country – both state and federal – have helpfully observed, 
 
* B.S., Hannibal-LaGrange University; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2019; Senior Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2018–2019. 
 1. See Michelle S. Viegas, Community Development and the South Beach Suc-
cess Story, 12 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 389, 392–93 (2005) (“Miami has earned its 
renown . . . from its . . . celebrity-frequented hotels and beaches . . . .  This area’s mobile 
and diverse population of . . . independently wealthy entrepreneurs, models and tourists 
contributes to an eclectic atmosphere unlike any other in the United States.”). 
 2. See Brief for the United States at 6–7, United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 
1307 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 3), modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th 
Cir. 2016), (No. 13–12385–CC), 2014 WL 6844552, *7–12. 
 3. See id. at 13–15. 
 4. See Fraud and False Statements, 18 U.S.C. ch. 47 (2012); see also Lawrence 
Bader, Trying to Define ‘Fraud’ Under Federal Criminal Law, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2011, 
9:56 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2011/10/19/trying-to-define-fraud-
1
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“The law does not define fraud; it needs no definition.  It is as old as falsehood 
and as versatile as human ingenuity.”5  But this lack of definition means that 
the distinction between being defrauded and merely being deceived still pre-
sents itself in cases today.  In the summer of 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the shortcomings of fraud in United States 
v. Takhalov.6 
Takhalov is a case about booze, babes, and business practices that could 
easily be called deceptive.7  Wealthy Miami tourists were effectively tricked 
into spending exorbitant sums of money on drinks and caviar in an effort to 
entertain attractive women whom they believed to be friendly fellow tourists, 
but were, in reality, employees of bars.8  The case raises the question of whether 
all deceit is fraud or whether there is a level at which insidious entrepreneurs 
can mislead customers without violating federal statutes that prohibit fraudu-
lent practices.9 
This Note analyzes the facts and holdings of Takhalov and then delves 
into the history of statutes that prohibit employees from drinking and/or min-
gling with patrons, as well as the history of wire fraud.  Next, it discusses the 
importance of not abusing the wire fraud statute so as to maintain a fine line 
between fraud and deceit.  Lastly, this Note contends that the prosecution over-
stepped its bounds by bringing charges pursuant to the wrong criminal statute 
and that the correct statute, under which the prosecution should have brought 
charges, needs to carry tougher penalties. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
The Defendants collectively owned and operated a group of bars and 
nightclubs in South Beach, the most prominent of which was known as Caviar 
Bar.10  Early in 2010, the Defendants constructed a plan to capitalize on Miami 
tourism.11  They hired a number of young, attractive women, many of whom 
 
under-federal-criminal-law/#4608a7001527 (“Interestingly, the word fraud is not de-
fined under [the federal criminal] statutes.”). 
 5. State v. Shaw, 847 S.W.2d 768, 775 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (quoting United 
States v. Bishop, 825 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1987)). 
 6. 827 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 3), modified on denial of reh’g, 838 
F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.; Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 20. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 6–12. 
 11. Id. at 8–9. 
2
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were foreign, known as “B-girls”12 to help attract business.13  The B-girls 
would work in pairs, scouring local hotels in search of available men.14  In 
particular, they would look for “telltale signs of wealth, such as expensive 
watches or shoes.”15  Once they found their marks, they would approach the 
men and pose as wholesome tourists in search of company.16  The women 
would then proceed to get the men as drunk as possible with the ultimate goal 
of enticing them to go to Caviar Bar (or one of the Defendants’ other clubs) in 
mind.17  The men, spurred along by hard drinking and casual conversation and 
totally unaware of the arrangement between the women and the bar, were often 
happy to oblige.18 
At the Defendants’ club, the plan would come full circle.  At the encour-
agement of the B-girls, targets invariably bought bottles of expensive cham-
pagne, rounds of excessively priced drinks, and heaps of fine Beluga caviar.19  
As the night continued, the number of drinks the men consumed would accu-
mulate, which would cause their recollection of the evening to blur as their bar 
tabs began to soar.20  In total, an estimated ninety men were enticed out of more 
 
 12. A “B-girl” is “a woman employed by a bar, nightclub or the like, to act as a 
companion to male customers and to induce them to buy drinks, and usually paid a 
percentage of what the customers spend.”  Amanda H. Littauer, The B-Girl Evil: Bu-
reaucracy, Sexuality, and the Menace of Barroom Vice in Postwar California, 12 J. 
HIST. SEXUALITY 171, 174 (2003).  The concept of “B-girls” and bars employing 
women to encourage men to purchase drinks goes back generations.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Amadio, 215 F.2d 605, 609–10 (7th Cir.), rev’d, 348 U.S. 892 (1954) (“Al-
most all of the taverns and night clubs had ‘B girls’ . . . engaged in soliciting drinks 
from men customers.”); People v. Burnette, 102 P.2d 799, 805 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1940). 
 13. Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310. 
 14. Jay Weaver, Federal Trial of Miami Beach Club Operators Linked to Russian 
Mob Gets Underway, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 10, 2012, 8:37 AM), http://www.miami-
herald.com/latest-news/article1943427.html. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310. 
 17. Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 13–14. 
 18. Id. at 14, 40. 
 19. See id. at 14–15; see also Nina Golgowski, The Miami Honeytrap, 
DAILYMAIL.COM (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2227974/Alec-Simchuk-Russian-mobster-Miami-bar-girls-trial-reveals-1M-scam-
Eastern-European-women.html.  According to the government, club employees would 
stop at nothing to keep the tab accruing, including providing shots of liquor that were 
kept behind the counter to “impair” the men further, ordering bottles for the victims, 
and possibly drugging the men.  Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 15.  
“[E]mployees would pour vodka in the men’s beer to get them drunker, misrepresent 
the prices of drinks, hide menus, cover up prices, and even forge the men’s signatures 
on credit-card receipts.”  Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310. 
 20. See Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 14. 
3
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than $1,300,000 at the encouragement of the B-girls.21  The most prominent 
victim, a former on-air meteorologist from Philadelphia, was influenced out of 
$43,000 over a two-night period.22 
The government viewed the Defendants’ business enterprise as criminal, 
claiming the whole operation was nothing more than an unlawful scheme built 
on a series of lies.23  In its view, the lies began the moment the girls first intro-
duced themselves to the men24 and ended with unsuspecting tourists blackout 
drunk, several thousand dollars poorer, or, in many cases, both.25  Thus, in an 
effort to bring the scheme to a halt, a grand jury indicted the Defendants on a 
combined total of ninety-eight separate charges, including eighty-five counts 
of wire fraud,26 four counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud,27 four counts 
of conspiracy to commit money laundering,28 four counts of visa fraud,29 and 
one count of bribery.30  
The government argued that the jury could have convicted the Defendants 
of fraud based simply on the lies the women told the men to lure them into the 
bar in the first place, regardless of what happened after the men got there.31  
Had the men known the women were actually club employees rather than 
friendly strangers, they would not have entered the club.32  In the government’s 
 
 21. See id. at 79 (finding Pavlenko was responsible for $273,897 in loss; Feldman 
was responsible for $334,040 in loss; and Takhalov was responsible for $719,219 in 
loss); Weaver, supra note 14. 
 22. Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 26–27; see also Weaver, supra 
note 14. 
 23. See Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310. 
 24. The women had incentive to initiate contact, as the typical arrangement was 
that each B-girl received a twenty percent commission for bringing in customers.  
Weaver, supra note 14.  
 25. Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 26–29. 
 26. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).  The wire fraud statute allows for a charge to be 
brought for each individual occurrence of fraud and does not require that each occur-
rence be grouped together in one charge.  See United States v. Castillo, 829 F.2d 1194, 
1199 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 27. 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012).  
 28. Id. § 1956(h) (2012). 
 29. Id. § 1546 (2012). 
 30. Id. § 201; Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 2–3.  Pavlenko and 
Feldman were each charged with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, twenty-
six counts of substantive wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security (visa fraud), and one count of conspiracy to commit 
money laundering.  Id. at 2.  Takhalov was charged with two counts of conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud, thirty-three counts of substantive wire fraud, two counts of conspir-
acy to defraud the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (visa fraud), two counts of 
conspiracy to commit money laundering, and one count of bribery.  Id. at 2–3. 
 31. United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 
3), modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 32. Id. 
4
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view, any business conducted in the bar took place under false pretenses and 
amounted to fraud.33 
The Defendants’ story differed.  During the trial, the Defendants freely 
admitted that they had tricked men into entering their clubs, but they did not 
believe that what they were doing was illegal.34  Instead, the Defendants con-
tended that they believed the scheme was “a perfectly legitimate business 
model.”35  They argued that if all the government could prove was that the men 
were tricked into entering the bar, then the men were merely deceived but not 
defrauded.36  Although the women might have concealed their relationship 
with the club, once inside the club, the men ordered bottles of alcohol, drank 
them with their female companions, and were charged a price that they agreed 
to pay.37  Thus, in the Defendants’ view, none of the men were truly “vic-
tims.”38  Instead, they simply “got what they paid for – nothing more, nothing 
less.”39 
With that strategy in mind, and fearful that the jury might convict them 
of wire fraud based solely on their deceptive arrangement with the B-girls, the 
Defendants asked the trial court to instruct the jurors “that they must acquit if 
they found that the defendants had tricked the victims into entering a transac-
tion but nevertheless gave the victims exactly what they asked for and charged 
them exactly what they agreed to pay.”40  The trial court, believing that to be a 
misstatement of the law, did not allow the instruction.41 
Ultimately, a jury from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida convicted the Defendants on only twenty of the ninety-eight com-
bined counts.42  However, those twenty counts were enough to result in the 
Defendants being sentenced to a sum total of more than thirty years imprison-
ment and being ordered to pay over $90,000 in restitution.43   
 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. at 1310–11. 
 35. Id. at 1310. 
 36. Id. at 1311. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1310. 
 41. Id. at 1311. 
 42. Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 3–4.  Pavlenko was convicted of 
ten counts total, including one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, eight counts 
of substantive wire fraud, and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering.  
Id. at 3.  Feldman was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and 
one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering.  Id. at 3–4.  Takhalov was con-
victed of eight total counts, consisting of two counts of conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud, three counts of substantive wire fraud, two counts of conspiracy to commit 
money laundering, and one count of visa fraud.  Id. at 4.   
 43. Id. at 3–6.  Pavlenko received a seventy-eight-month (six-and-a-half-year) 
sentence with three years of supervised release and was ordered to pay $6,491.60 in 
restitution.  Id. at 5.  Feldman received a 100-month (eight-and-a-third-year) sentence 
with three years of supervised release and was ordered to pay $15,498 in restitution.  
5
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On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed 
and remanded all but a single visa fraud conviction, holding that the trial court 
abused its judicial discretion in refusing to give an instruction that could have 
possibly led the jury to reach a different verdict.44 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. B-Girl Statutes 
Hiring girls to encourage men to spend money is a concept that has been 
around for ages.  In America, the earliest evidence of this opportunistic behav-
ior can be traced back at least as far as the 1850s.45  During that period, women 
followed men out West, as both were anxious to capitalize on the gold rush.46  
Although ploys such as the “B-girl racket” were forced into a temporary hiatus 
during prohibition, they bounced back quickly, and taverns regularly employed 
saloon waitresses “whose constant pleas of ‘just one more little drink’ cost 
many a customer his shirt.”47  These schemes flourished by the middle of the 
twentieth century “when hundreds of bars and night clubs [across the country] 
maintained salaried staffs of B-girls, who kept customers company at the bar 
and matched them drink-for-drink – in colored water, tea or soda pop, but at 
whiskey prices.”48 
Legislators began to take note of the sheer amount of money being taken 
in by this “less than wholesome” industry, and, in an effort to eliminate these 
types of enticements, states began passing laws to prohibit them.49  The reasons 
ascribed to these kinds of regulations were many.  Among them were to avoid 
 
Id.  Takhalov received a 204-month (seventeen year) sentence with three years of su-
pervised release and was ordered to pay $68,757.57 in restitution.  Id. at 5–6. 
 44. Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1324–25. 
 45. See Littauer, supra note 12, at 174. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 174–75 (“B-girls reappeared after Prohibition and became standard fea-
tures of popular . . . bars during the Depression, wartime, and postwar years.”); see B-




 48. SCHENECTADY GAZETTE, supra note 47.  B-girls have also appeared in popular 
culture.  For example, Marilyn Monroe famously portrayed a B-girl in Bus Stop (1956).  
See Littauer, supra note 12, at 195.  In the film, Monroe’s character, Sherrie, consumes 
four tea-and-sodas before her companion catches on and confronts her.  Id. at 195–96 
n.81.  Monroe was nominated for a Golden Globe for her portrayal.  Winners & Nomi-
nees: Marilyn Monroe, GOLDEN GLOBES, https://www.goldenglobes.com/person/mar-
ilyn-monroe (last visited Aug. 26, 2018). 
 49. See J. E. Leonarz, Annotation, Regulations Forbidding Employees or Enter-
tainers from Drinking or Mingling with Patrons, or Soliciting Drinks from Them, 99 
A.L.R.2d 1216, § 1[a] (1965) (updated weekly). 
6
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a deliberate commercial exploitation of the customer;50 to curtail personal con-
tact between female employees and nightclub patrons;51 to avoid the danger to 
the public that bars might be converted from their proper use as places of so-
ciable and relaxed drinking into places for solicitation of customers;52 to pre-
vent the evils resulting from encouraging customers to spend more money and 
drink more alcohol than they otherwise would;53 and to eliminate the occupa-
tion of B-girls entirely – “a practice said to have done more to bring criticism 
upon the liquor industry than anything else.”54 
While most states do not have a statute designed to prohibit arrangements 
in which bars hire women for the sole purpose of boosting business, Florida is 
one of the few states that does.55  Enacted in 1961, Florida Statutes section 
562.131 makes it unlawful for any employee56 or agent of an establishment that 
possesses a liquor license to “beg or solicit any patron or customer” of that 
establishment to buy them a drink.57  Further, it is unlawful for any establish-
ment possessing a liquor license to knowingly permit any person in or around 
the premises “for the purpose of begging or soliciting any patron or customer” 
to buy drinks.58  Florida has made violation of section 562.131 a second-degree 
misdemeanor59 punishable by a maximum term of sixty days imprisonment and 
not more than $500 in fines.60 
 
 50. Greenblatt v. Martin, 2 Cal. Rptr. 508, 511 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960). 
 51. City of New Orleans v. Kiefer, 164 So. 2d 336, 339 (La. 1964). 
 52. Greenblatt, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 511. 
 53. City of Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So. 2d 798, 803 (Fla. 1957). 
 54. Leonarz, supra note 49, § 2 (citing United States v. R & J Enters., 178 F. Supp. 
1, 4 (D. Alaska 1959)). 
 55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.131 (West 2018); see also, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 
04.16.020 (West 2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 303 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
244.030 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 26:286 (2018); TEX. CODE ANN. § 104.01 
(West 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.36 (West 2018). 
 56. The I.R.S. considers B-girls to be employees for income tax purposes.  Rev. 
Rul. 62-157, 1962-2 C.B. 216 (“Where individuals mingle with and encourage custom-
ers to buy drinks in night clubs or similar-type establishments for remuneration deter-
mined on a commission basis or otherwise (the so-called B-Girls), they are employees 
of the operators of the establishments with respect to such services for purposes of the 
Federal employment taxes.”). 
 57. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.131(1). 
 58. Id. § 562.131(2). 
 59. Id. § 562.131(3). 
 60. Id. § 775.082(4)(b) (West 2018) (referencing the sixty days imprisonment); Id. 
§ 775.083(1)(e) (West 2018) (noting the maximum $500 fine). 
7
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Perhaps even more pertinent to the case at hand, the City of Miami like-
wise has its own ordinance restricting B-girl activity, which predates the Flor-
ida statute.61  The Miami ordinance goes a step further than the Florida statute 
and makes it illegal for employees to “mingle or fraternize with customers.”62 
B. Wire Fraud 
Enacted in 1952, the federal wire fraud statute63 serves as “a jurisdictional 
hook” to facilitate federal prosecutorial involvement where it is not otherwise 
explicitly authorized.64  Wire fraud generally consists of (1) a scheme to de-
fraud by means of a material deception; (2) where the perpetrator intended to 
defraud; (3) while using interstate wires to carry out the scheme; (4) which 
resulted in, or would have resulted in, the loss of money or property.65  The 
United States Supreme Court has observed on multiple occasions that the stat-
ute encompasses “everything designed to defraud by representations as to the 
past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future.”66  Thus, the stat-
ute is regularly used as a tool to prosecute general wrongdoing because trans-
actions involving credit cards are transmitted across state lines, thereby consti-
tuting a “wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign com-
merce.”67    
Although the wire fraud statute makes criminal “any scheme or artifice to 
defraud,” the statute itself does not explain what constitutes such a scheme or 
 
 61. Compare B-Girls Fading Attraction in Bars Throughout U.S., supra note 47 
(noting that in 1954, Miami enacted an ordinance to restrict B-girl activity), with FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 562.131 (originally enacted as the Professional Service Corporation Act, 
ch. 621–234 (1961)). 
 62. MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 4-4 (2018), https://library.municode.com/fl/mi-
ami/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIITHCO_CH4ALBE_ARTIINGE_S4-
4EMNOMICU (“It shall be unlawful for employees or entertainers in places dispensing 
alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises to mingle or fraternize with the 
customers or patrons of such establishment.”). 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).  The wire fraud statute is modeled after the mail 
fraud statute, which has been in existence since the 1872.  C.J. Williams, What Is the 
Gist of the Mail Fraud Statute?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 287 (2014).  The mail fraud statute 
was originally enacted “to address the sale of counterfeit currency through the United 
States Mail.”  Id. at 291. 
 64. Id. at 307. 
 65. Devika Singh et al., Mail and Wire Fraud, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1555, 1557 
(2017). 
 66. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 377 (2005) (Ginsburg J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896)). 
 67. 18 U.S.C. § 1343; Peter R. Ezersky, Intra-Corporate Mail and Wire Fraud: 
Criminal Liability for Fiduciary Breach, 94 YALE L.J. 1427, 1428 (1985). 
8
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artifice,68 leaving the phrase “scheme to defraud” to be “judicially defined.”69  
Modern courts have defined the phrase broadly, allowing it to encompass de-
ceptive schemes that do not fit the common law definition of fraud.70  In many 
courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, a scheme to defraud is measured by a 
“reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right 
dealing in the general and business life of members of society.”71  Generally, a 
scheme to defraud involves depriving a person of “something of value by trick, 
deceit, chicane, or overreaching.”72 
Simply put, the flexibility of this language sets the bar for charging wire 
fraud extremely low, making the statute a preferred weapon of the govern-
ment.73  For this reason, the statute has been described as both a “blessing and 
[a] curse.”74  On one hand, the wire fraud statute serves “as a first line of de-
fense” or “stopgap device” to address previously unseen forms of criminal con-
duct that fail to fall within more specific legislation.75  On the other hand, the 
statute can be used as a vehicle for prosecuting certain behaviors that, “albeit 
offensive to the morals or aesthetics of federal prosecutors, cannot reasonably 
be expected by the instigators to form the basis of a federal felony.”76  And 
while the Justice Department claims to defer federal prosecution for petty local 
fraud, no legal mechanism prevents abuse of this discretion.77 
However, despite its breadth, there are limits to the judicially created in-
terpretation of a “scheme to defraud.”78  The statute itself makes the most im-
portant limit obvious: The scheme must be one to defraud and cannot be some-
thing that, while possibly misleading or even unethical, falls short of outright 
fraud.79  Many courts, such as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
 
 68. 18 U.S.C. § 1343.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “artifice” as “a clever plan 
or idea, esp. one intended to deceive.”  Artifice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 69. United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1208 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
 70. Id. at 1240. 
 71. Id. (quoting Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958)). 
 72. Id. (quoting Pendergraft, 297 F.3d at 1208–09). 
 73. Charles Clark, “Schemes to Defraud” Under the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud 
Statutes: Development of a Working Definition, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 679, 684 
(2010). 
 74. United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1079 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 75. Id. (quoting United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405–06 (1974) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Gregory Howard Williams, Good Government by Prosecutorial Decree: The 
Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137, 145–46, 152 (1990) (“U.S. Attor-
neys or their assistants decide largely on their own what improper practices warrant 
federal prosecution” and that “the inquiry is evaluative rather than mechanistic.”). 
 78. United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 
3), modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States 
v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1240 (11th Cir. 2011)).  
 79. Id. 
9
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distinguish between schemes that merely induce their victims to engage in 
transactions that they otherwise would have avoided – which are not violations 
of the federal wire fraud statute – and schemes that depend upon a misrepre-
sentation of a fundamental element of the bargain for their completion  – which 
are violations of the federal wire fraud statute.80  The Second Circuit has also 
held that misrepresentations that only amount to deceit are not enough to main-
tain a federal wire fraud prosecution.81  Instead, the deceit must be paired with 
an anticipated harm to the victim that affects “the very nature of the bargain 
itself.”82 
Thus, to constitute a “scheme to defraud,” as used in the wire fraud stat-
ute, a defendant must intend to harm the victim by lying about the nature of the 
bargain itself.83  That lie can fit two primary frameworks: “the defendant might 
lie about the price (e.g., if he promises that a good costs $10 when it in fact 
costs $20)” or the defendant “might lie about the characteristics of the good 
(e.g., if he promises that a gemstone is a diamond when it is in fact a cubic 
zirconium).”84  In either instance, the defendant has lied about the nature of the 
bargain, hence, in both instances the defendant has committed criminal wire 
fraud.85  But if the defendant lies about something other than price or quality, 
for example, “if he says that he is the long-lost cousin of a prospective buyer – 
then he has not lied about the nature of the bargain, has not ‘schemed to de-
fraud,’ and cannot be convicted of wire fraud on the basis of that lie alone.”86 
Federal wire fraud charges carry a much stiffer penalty than state statutes 
prohibiting B-girls.87  A person convicted of federal wire fraud can be “fined 
[up to] $1,000,000 or imprisoned [up to thirty] years, or both.”88  The most 
severe sentences are generally reserved for cases in which the fraud involves a 
financial institution coupled with other aggravating circumstances.89  How-
 
 80. United States v. Shellef, 507 F.3d 82, 108 (2d Cir. 2007); see also United 
States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 81. Shellef, 507 F.3d at 108 (quoting Starr, 816 F.2d at 98–99). 
 82. Starr, 816 F.2d at 98; see also United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 
F.2d 1174, 1182 (2d Cir. 1970) (“[W]e conclude that the defendants intended to deceive 
their customers but they did not intend to defraud them, because the falsity of their 
representations was not shown to be capable of affecting the customer’s understanding 
of the bargain . . . .”). 
 83. Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1313.  
 84. Id. at 1313–14 (italics omitted).  
 85. Id. at 1314. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.131(3) (West 2018) (listing statutes imposing 
a second-degree misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of sixty days imprisonment 
and not more than $500), with 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (carrying a maximum term of 
thirty years imprisonment and not more than $1,000,000 in fines for a federal wire fraud 
conviction under certain circumstances). 
 88. 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 
 89. Id. 
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ever, due to a large array of enhancements available under the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, the average conviction carries with it a sentence in excess of 
two years in a federal penitentiary.90  And because each wire transmission con-
stitutes a separate act of wire fraud,91 the penalties can add up quickly, espe-
cially when combined with similar charges, such as conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud or money laundering, as in the case at hand.92 
C. Abuse of Judicial Discretion 
As is the case with any conviction, the hurdle for overturning a jury ver-
dict based on abuse of judicial discretion is a difficult one to clear.93   To show 
an abuse of discretion for refusal to give a proposed jury instruction in the 
Eleventh Circuit, “a defendant must first show that the requested instruction 
was a correct statement of the law.”94  Further, he or she must also show “that 
the instruction dealt with a sufficiently important point raised during trial” that 
was important enough that failure to give the proposed instruction might have 
critically interfered with the defendant’s ability to conduct his or her defense.95  
Finally, even if a proposed instruction was a correct statement of law, which 
dealt with a sufficiently important point that was raised during trial, a convic-
tion must stand unless the defendant can “show that the proposed instruction 
‘was not substantially covered by a charge actually given.’”96 
 
 90. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 
FISCAL YEAR 2017 11 (June 2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/re-
search-and-publications/research-publica-
tions/2018/FY17_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf (stating the average sen-
tence imposed in all fraud cases in fiscal year 2017 at twenty-six months imprison-
ment); U.S. SENTENCING; U.S. DEP’T JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. SPECIAL REPORT, 
FEDERAL OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME 7 (Sept. 1987), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/whc_1985.pdf (reporting the average sentence 
length specific to wire fraud convictions in 1985 to be thirty-three months imprison-
ment); Singh et al., supra note 65, at 1574–75. 
 91. Singh et al., supra note 65, at 1557 n.16 (alteration in original) (citing United 
States v. Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 367 (4th Cir. 2012)) (“[I]t is settled that each mailing 
or wire transmission in furtherance of the fraud scheme constitutes a separate offense . 
. . .”). 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 
3), modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016). (“Following closing 
arguments, the jury convicted the defendants on several counts, including multiple 
counts of wire fraud and money laundering.”). 
 93. See Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary 
Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 54 (2000) (examining the difficulty of 
finding “abuse of discretion” because of the deference granted to lower courts). 
 94. Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1312 (citing United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 
947–48 11th Cir. 2006)). 
 95. Id. at 1316 (citing Eckhardt, 466 F.3d at 947–48). 
 96. Id. at 1316 (quoting Eckhardt, 466 F.3d at 947–48). 
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IV. INSTANT DECISION 
Judge Amul R. Thapar97 wrote for the Eleventh Circuit’s three-judge 
panel, stating that the federal wire fraud statute “does not enact as federal law 
the Ninth Commandant given to Moses on Sinai” (“Thou shalt not bear false 
witness against thy neighbor.”).98  Federal law “forbids only schemes to de-
fraud, not schemes to do other wicked things, e.g., schemes to lie, trick, or 
otherwise deceive.”99  The difference, according to Judge Thapar, is that “de-
ceiving does not always involve harming another person; defrauding does.”100  
The court carefully distinguished schemes to deceive from schemes to defraud, 
noting that Black’s Law Dictionary “defines the word ‘defraud’ as ‘[t]o cause 
injury or loss to (a person or organization) by deceit’” and defines the word 
“‘deception’ as ‘[t]he act of deliberately causing someone to believe that some-
thing is true when the actor knows it to be false.’”101  Thus, the court surmised, 
“deceiving is a necessary condition of defrauding but not a sufficient one.  Put 
another way, one who defrauds always deceives, but one can deceive without 
defrauding.”102 
With this in mind, the court reasoned that “to defraud, one must intend to 
use deception to cause some injury; however, one can deceive without intend-
ing to harm at all.”103  Thus, in the court’s view, “deceiving does not always 
involve harming another person; defrauding does.”104  Therefore, according to 
the court, in addition to deception, the government had to show that the decep-
tion caused an injury in order to satisfy the definition of actionable fraud.105  In 
applying this rule, Judge Thapar used an analogy of a more common scenario: 
 
 97. Judge Thapar, sitting by designation, was visiting from the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Kentucky.  Id. at 1309 n.*.  Judge Thapar is known for being 
by the book; for example, he once sentenced an eighty-four-year-old nun to prison.  See 
United States v. Walli, 976 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1001, 1006–07 (E.D. Tenn. 2013); Duane 
W. Gang, Nun Sentenced to 35 Months in Nuclear Plant Break-in, USA TODAY (Feb. 
18, 2014, 11:13 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/18/nun-
nuke-protest-sentencing/5577947/.  Subsequent to the decision in United States v. Ta-
khalov, Judge Thapar was nominated and confirmed for a seat on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, receiving his commission on May 25, 2017.  Amul 
Thapar, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Amul_Thapar (last visited Aug. 26, 
2018). 
 98. Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1310 n.1. 
 99. Id. (italics omitted).  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1312 (alterations in original) (quoting Defraud, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Deception, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 1310. 
 105. Id. at 1312. 
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[A] young woman asks a rich businessman to buy her a drink at Bob’s 
Bar.  The businessman buys the drink, and afterwards the young woman 
decides to leave.  Did the man get what he bargained for?  Yes.  He 
received his drink, and he had the opportunity to buy a young woman a 
drink.  Does it change things if the woman is Bob’s sister and he paid 
her to recruit customers?  No; regardless of Bob’s relationship with the 
woman, the businessman got exactly what he bargained for.  If, on the 
other hand, Bob promised to pour the man a glass of Pappy Van Winkle 
but gave him a slug of Old Crow instead, well, that would be fraud.  
Why?  Because the misrepresentation goes to the value of the bar-
gain.106 
Here, the court noted that there was little doubt of the Defendants’ intent 
to deceive; they even admitted as much during trial.107  Further, when the facts 
are viewed as a whole – everything from the Defendants’ arrangements with 
the B-girls, to the girls locating unsuspecting men at area hotels, to luring the 
men to the Defendants’ clubs and running up bar tabs – an argument could be 
made that there was intent to defraud.108  However, the court pointed out that, 
in order to sustain a wire fraud conviction, the scheme to defraud must have 
involved misrepresentations that go to the nature of the bargain underlying the 
transaction.109  Even if the Defendants lied, and even if the victims made pur-
chases based on those lies, “a wire fraud case must end in an acquittal if the 
jury nevertheless believes that the alleged victims ‘received exactly what they 
paid for.’”110  In this case, since the Defendants’ misrepresentations regarded 
their arrangement with the B-girls, and those misrepresentations did not extend 
to either the price or quality of the goods sold to the victims, the court held the 
Defendants had merely deceived and not defrauded.111 
However, lack of fraud alone on the part of the Defendants was not 
enough to overturn a jury verdict; instead, there needed to be a more significant 
error in the trial itself.112  While the Defendants’ appeal was grounded in a 
claim of failure to allow a proper jury instruction, and in this case that instruc-
tion was never given, that failure could only rise to abuse of judicial discretion 
if it was a correct statement of the law that dealt with a sufficiently important 
 
 106. Id. at 1313 (footnotes omitted).  Judge Thapar supplied two footnotes to ex-
plain that Pappy Van Winkle or “‘Pappy’s’ as it is often called, is a particularly rare 
bourbon varietal: nearly impossible to find, and nearly impossible to afford when one 
finds it.”  Old Crow, on the other hand, despite having “a venerable pedigree – report-
edly the go-to drink of Mark Twain, Ulysses S. Grant, Hunter Thompson, and Henry 
Clay – is not Kentucky’s most-expensive liquor.  Its ‘deluxe’ version, ‘Old Crow Re-
serve,’ retails for approximately $15 per bottle.”  Id. at 1313 n.5–6. 
 107. Id. at 1310. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. at 1313–14. 
 110. Id. (quoting United States v. Shellef, 507 F.3d 82, 108 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 111. Id. at 1313–14. 
 112. See, e.g., id. at 1316–17 (finding the government did not prove the error was 
harmless). 
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point raised during trial that “was not substantially covered by a charge actually 
given” to the jury.113 
The court acknowledged that the requested instruction, which was denied 
by the trial court, seemed to be a correct statement of the law because “‘failure 
to disclose the financial arrangement between the B-girls and the Bar’ was not 
‘in and of itself’ sufficient to convict the defendants of wire fraud.”114  Addi-
tionally, the court concluded that the denied instruction was certainly important 
enough that failure to give it might have critically interfered with the Defend-
ants’ ability to put forth their defense.115  After all, Judge Thapar explained, 
“[I]f the jurors believed that they could convict based only on the B-girls’ fail-
ure ‘to disclose the financial arrangement between the B-girls and the Bar,’ 
then the defense’s theory would have collapsed entirely.”116   
However, even though the denied instruction was accurate and material, 
the court held that such instruction must not have been substantially covered 
by a similar instruction before an abuse of discretion could be found.117  The 
court explained that whether a given instruction substantially covered a re-
quested one depended on “the size of the logical leap that a juror would need 
to make to get from the instruction the court gave to the instruction the defend-
ant requested.”118  Here, to get from the given instruction119 to the requested 
one,120 the inference “that a person is not ‘deceived or cheated out of money or 
property’ if he gets exactly what he paid for even though he is deceived into 
paying in the first place” required too great of a logical leap.121  After all, Judge 
Thapar observed, “[T]he average juror is not Mr. Spock:”122 he or she needs to 
be specifically instructed by the judge on the legal issues.123 
 
 113. Id. at 1316 (quoting United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 948 (11th Cir. 
2006)). 
 114. Id. at 1314–15. 
 115. Id. at 1316 (quoting Eckhardt, 466 F.3d at 947–48).  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1318. 
 119. The trial court instructed the jurors “that the defendants were guilty of wire 
fraud only if they intended to ‘deceive or cheat someone out of money or property.’” 
Id. 
 120. That “[f]ailure to disclose the financial arrangement between the B-girls and 
the Bar, in and of itself, is not sufficient to convict a defendant of any offense.”  Id. at 
1317. 
 121. Id. at 1318. 
 122. Mr. Spock is a fictional character in the Star Trek franchise who, as a member 
of the “Vulcan” species, thinks in a very mechanical, highly logical manner.  Mark 
Hensch, Obama Explains ‘Spock-like’ Impression: It Was Hard Acting ‘Cheerful’ in 
2009, THE HILL (Jan. 19, 2017, 8:36 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administra-
tion/315021-obama-it-was-hard-acting-cheerful-in-2009. 
 123. See Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1318.  Judge Thapar jokingly noted, “As it stands, 
however, the vast majority of American juries are composed exclusively of humans.  
And humans, unlike Vulcans, sometimes need a bit more guidance as to exactly what 
the court’s instructions logically entail.”  Id. 
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Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court had, in fact, abused 
its discretion by not allowing the proposed jury instruction requested by the 
Defendants.124  Judge Thapar acknowledged that the district court had presided 
over a long and complex criminal trial and that the district court’s evidentiary 
and other legal rulings were nearly flawless.125  Nevertheless, “the district court 
refused to give a jury instruction that was a correct statement of the law, was 
critical to the defense’s case theory, and was not substantially covered by other 
instructions.”126  Thus, the wire fraud convictions could not stand and, absent 
wire fraud, the conspiracy and money laundering convictions also could not 
stand.127  In the end, with the exception of a visa violation, all of the Defend-
ants’ convictions were overturned.128 
V. COMMENT 
Considering how important the offense of fraud is to white-collar crime 
and considering that white-collar crime has been in existence for decades, one 
might expect the definition of fraud to be clear by now.  However, United 
States v. Takhalov highlights the ongoing uncertainty about what constitutes 
criminal fraud.  Most common white-collar offenses include “fraud” in their 
title: mail fraud, wire fraud, credit card fraud, health care fraud, computer 
fraud, securities fraud, bank fraud, tax fraud, and so on.129 
Because “fraud is infinite in variety,”130 courts struggle in attempting to 
define it.131  But, of course, a proper definition is needed because human inge-
nuity also concocts many schemes that may be deceptive at their core but are 
technically not criminal.  Criminal law requires the drawing of lines between 
 
 124. Id. at 1319. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1323–25. 
 128. Id. at 1325.  In its original holding, the Eleventh Circuit reversed all of the 
wire fraud convictions except for one, which was allowed to stand because of a lie that 
the Defendants told to American Express.  See United States v. Takhalov, 838 F.3d 
1168, 1169 (11th Cir. 2016).  However, the court held a rehearing three months later 
regarding the remaining wire fraud conviction.  Id.  Upon review, it was determined 
that the lie had not “furthered a fraud scheme” and it did not amount to “fraud after the 
fact.”  Id. at 1169–70.  Thus, the final wire fraud conviction was also overturned, and 
the original holding was modified.  Id. at 1170. 
 129. See 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (2012) (credit card fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 911 (2012) (citi-
zenship fraud); id. §§ 1028, 1028A (identity theft fraud); id. § 1030 (computer fraud); 
id. § 1341 (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud); id. § 1344 (bank fraud); id. § 1347 
(2012) (health care fraud); id. § 1348 (securities fraud); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7202–04 (2012) 
(tax fraud). 
 130. Reddaway v. Banham [1896] 74 LT 289 (HL) at 297. 
 131. See, e.g., Allcard v. Skinner [1887] 57 L. Times 61 (Ct. of App.) [73] (“[N]o 
court has ever attempted to define fraud.”); Foshay v. United States, 68 F.2d 205, 211 
(8th Cir. 1933) (“To try to delimit ‘fraud’ by definition would tend to reward subtle and 
ingenious circumvention and is not done.”). 
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conduct that actually amounts to fraud and conduct that is merely dishonest or 
unethical – and sometimes those lines can be quite blurry.  As the great Justice 
Holmes once pondered, “[H]ow strong an infusion of fraud is necessary to turn 
a flavor into a poison”?132 
For better or worse, and in spite of the men who were taken for their 
money, Judge Thapar and the Eleventh Circuit got the ruling in Takhalov cor-
rect.133  The court’s duty is to merely interpret the law, not create it.134  Alt-
hough the Defendants’ actions were despicable, dishonest, misleading, and, as 
the court pointed out, deceitful, they were nonetheless legitimate business 
transactions.  To hold otherwise – to find that a business transaction in which 
a customer orders an item, receives it, and is subsequently charged exactly what 
he or she agreed to pay as being improper – would be concerning.  To take that 
a step further and find that such a transaction rose to the level of actionable 
fraud could threaten to crack the foundation of at least one constitutional 
amendment.135 
Setting a precedent that deceit constitutes fraud would broaden the gray 
area between what is legal and what is criminal, and no doubt open the law to 
the proverbial slippery slope.136  Imagine a scenario in which a lottery adver-
tises a multi-million-dollar jackpot and an uneducated, unsuspecting young 
adult buys a ticket in hopes of hitting it big.  Should the lottery organizers be 
held responsible when the ticket purchaser feels defrauded after realizing that 
his or her chances of hitting the jackpot are minuscule?  In this scenario, as 
well as the case at hand, the plan organizers profited from the “scheme.”  Fur-
ther, in both instances, it is clear that the organizers used deception to their 
advantage.  However, few would argue that the organizers of the lottery de-
serve significant time in jail as a result of their transgression.  After all, the 
ticket purchaser knew what he or she was getting and got what he or she paid 
for.137  Likewise, in the case at hand, sentencing the Defendants to a term of 
imprisonment for exploiting deception would be unjust. 
 
 132. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 247 (1918) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 133. See generally United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.), as revised 
(Oct. 3), modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 134. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 290 (2008) (quoting Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)) (“[O]ur normal 
role is to interpret law created by others and ‘not to prescribe what it shall be.’”).  
 135. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (“The general right to 
make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual pro-
tected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”), overruled in part by Day-
Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 
726 (1963), and abrogated by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 136. A slippery slope is “[a] limited step that if taken now, in the view of one who 
warns against it, will inevitably lead to further, objectionable steps later.”  Slippery 
slope, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 137. For the very small price of a few dollars, he or she purchased an opportunity 
for lifelong financial security. 
16
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No, what the Defendants did was not illegal.  Somewhere between low 
moral standards and a penchant for profit lies a nexus in which objectionable 
business practices can thrive.  The Defendants found precisely that sweet spot.  
By combining booze with beautiful women, they willfully impaired the deci-
sion-making abilities of their customers and then capitalized on precisely that 
impairment.  In effect, they did little more than take advantage of a legal loop-
hole.138 
While not illegal, there can be no doubt that the Defendants knew what 
they were doing was “wrong.”139  Most would agree that there should have 
been at least some consequences to their suspect behavior, lest the public need 
be wary of this scam or similar scams popping up again not only in Miami, but 
in any tourist destination across the country flush with enough wealth to make 
the scheme practicable.  After all, the plan would have worked.  Absent legal 
fees, the Defendants would have been $1,300,000 richer.140 
In the case at hand, however, not only should there have been conse-
quences, but if the prosecution would have charged the Defendants with vio-
lating Florida’s B-girl statute,141 which prohibits employees of a bar from so-
liciting customers to purchase drinks for them, rather than with wire fraud,142 
the Defendants would have been certain to suffer those consequences.  Since 
the statute’s enactment by the Florida General Assembly in 1961, several con-
victions arising from it have been upheld by various appellate courts involving 
circumstances that were far less objectionable than the scheme being operated 
by the Defendants.143  But instead, the Defendants were never charged with 
violating the B-girl statute.144 
Due to the unique circumstances surrounding this case, the Defendants’ 
trial, conviction, and appeal were widely covered by both local and national 
 
 138. Florida law already precludes a finding of civil injury where a person’s own 
drunkenness is the principal cause of the occurrence of the injury.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 768.36(2) (West 2018).  Although this applies to civil liability and not criminal, the 
reasoning underlying the statute would apply to either. 
 139. The Defendants even admitted as much at trial as part of their defense strategy.  
United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1310, 1317 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 3), 
modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 140. See Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 79. 
 141. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.131 (West 2018). 
 142. Granted, charging the Defendants under the Florida B-girl statute would have 
required the case to be brought in state court rather than federal court. 
 143. See Shevin v. Bocaccio, Inc., 379 So. 2d 105, 106 (Fla. 1979) (constitutional); 
De Joris v. Lee, 151 So. 2d 830, 832 (Fla. 1963) (within the legislature’s police power); 
215-22nd St., Inc. v. Bd. of Bus. Regulation, Div. of Beverage, 330 So. 2d 821, 822 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (establishing elements); Torch Club, Inc. v. Keating, 174 So. 
2d 746, 746–47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (license revocation for violation). 
 144. See United States v. Pavlenko, No. 11-20279-CR, 2012 WL 222928, at *3 
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2012) (“[T]he jury will hear that a Florida criminal statute had been 
violated, even though nobody involved in this case was ever arrested for or charged 
with violating that statute.”). 
17
Lee: American Greed: The Eleventh Circuit Analyzes Whether Booze, Babe
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
770 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
media.145  Throughout the coverage, one theme became common between legal 
commentators and legal bloggers alike – why was this case being tried in fed-
eral court instead of state court?146  To borrow the words of Judge Thapar, it 
hardly requires “Holmesian feats of deduction”147 to infer why the state backed 
off of what should have been an open and shut case in favor of allowing the 
federal government to bring a case in which the facts were not in their favor.148  
One possible explanation exists – greed. 
The Defendants’ greed in this case cannot be denied; they all but admitted 
it as the lynchpin of their defense strategy.149  In fact, their devious white-collar 
scheme quite literally spawned an episode of the popular CNBC TV series, 
American Greed.150  But it is the prosecutorial greed here that should not be 
overlooked.  If the government had brought its case under the Florida B-girl 
statute,151 it is likely that it would have won.  Albeit such a conviction would 
have come at considerably lower stakes than the twelve years that the Defend-
ants’ were initially convicted of, since the Florida B-girl statute carries a max-
imum of sixty days imprisonment and a $500 fine.152 
 
 145. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 14 (covering the trial); Jay Weaver, Appeals 
Court Throws Out Miami Beach ‘Bar-Girl’ Convictions, MIAMI HERALD (July 11, 
2016, 7:41 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/mi-
ami-beach/article88982837.html (covering the appeal). 
 146. See, e.g., David Markus, Hot Girls Getting Guys Drunk on South Beach is Now 
a Federal Crime?, S. DIST. OF FLA. BLOG (Nov. 5, 2012, 9:19 AM), http://sdfla.blog-
spot.com/2012/11/hot-girls-getting-guys-drunk-on-south.html (“Clearly if this hap-
pened, it’s criminal.  But even if that happened, is it a federal offense?  Why isn’t this 
a classic state court crime?”). 
 147. “Sherlock or Oliver Wendell: either Holmes will do here.”  United States v. 
Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1318 n.9 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 3), modified on denial 
of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 148. The Florida B-girl statute expressly prohibits any holder of a liquor license “to 
knowingly permit any person to loiter in or about the licensed premises for the purpose 
of begging or soliciting any patron or customer . . . to purchase any beverage,” and 
there can be little doubt that is exactly what the Defendants did, since they, in fact, hired 
the women to lure guys to their clubs to purchase drinks.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.131(2) 
(West 2018); Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1307. 
 149. See id. at 1311. 
 150. American Greed: The Bar Girls Trap (CNBC television broadcast May 19, 
2016), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2016/05/12/the-bar-girls-trap-.html (Episode Pre-
view Description: “Beautiful women with looks that kill are controlled by Russian 
gangsters to seduce amorous men in nightclubs out of their money.  It’s a super expen-
sive hangover.”). 
 151. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.131 (West 2018) makes it illegal for a liquor license to 
“knowingly permit any person to loiter in or about the licensed premises for the purpose 
of begging or soliciting any patron or customer of, or visitor in, such premises to pur-
chase any beverage, alcoholic or otherwise.”  There can be little doubt that the Defend-
ants’ plan directly violated the statue. 
 152. See id. § 562.131(3); see id. § 775.082(4)(b) (West 2018); id. § 775.083(1)(e) 
(West 2018). 
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Regardless, the states in general, including Florida, need to create alter-
native avenues that provide harsher penalties for perpetrators who go beyond 
merely hiring employees for the purpose of “begging or soliciting” customers 
to purchase drinks and instead go so far as to intentionally deceive people out 
of millions of dollars.153  The law currently prohibits girls from entertaining 
guys at a bar, but perhaps there should be a separate penalty for girls that entice 
them to be there in the first place.154 
State and local governments clearly need other means of pursuing these 
types of cases as well as statutes that carry more severe penalties.  In the ab-
sence of harsher penalties or new statutes designed to curb these types of 
schemes, it is not unreasonable to suspect that similar schemes will continue.  
After all, the possibility of weighing a $500 penalty against a multi-million-
dollar upside simply makes these types of “business ventures” too easy to set 
up and too lucrative to pass up. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Lord Macnaghten famously quipped over a century ago that “fraud is in-
finite in variety.”155  This holds true in today’s digital age, where schemes to 
make a quick buck at the expense of others are seemingly ubiquitous.156  In 
United States v. Takhalov,157 the Eleventh Circuit addressed precisely one such 
scheme, and, in doing so, added some much-needed refining to the judicially-
crafted definition of fraud.  Ultimately, while the Defendants’ scheme to use 
alcohol and women to seduce profits out of unsuspecting tourists was mislead-
ing and deceitful, the Defendants’ dose of fraud was not “strong enough here 
to need a remedy from the law.”158 
 
 153. See id. § 562.131(2). 
 154. This Note, along with the case at hand, both generally refer to females as the 
ones soliciting the purchase of drinks, males as the ones being solicited, and universally 
makes use of the term “B-girls.”  However, as modern views have become more so-
phisticated, such terms are increasingly being viewed as sexist.  As a result, some ju-
risdictions have modified their laws to use a more politically correct phrase, such as “B 
drinkers.” E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 26:286 (2018) (making it illegal to “[e]mploy or per-
mit persons, commonly known as B drinkers, to solicit patrons for drinks . . . .”) (em-
phasis added); see also Adriane Quinlan, In Kenner, B-drinkers Will Still Be Illegal, 
But Don’t Call Them Girls, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 18, 2014), 
https://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/03/in_kenner_b-drinkers_will_stil.html. 
 155. Reddaway v. Banham [1896] 74 LT 289 (HL) at 297. 
 156. Common examples of such schemes include, among others, email scams, 
phishing scams, and identify theft. 
 157. See generally 827 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.), as revised (Oct. 3), modified on denial 
of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 158. In response to his statement about how strong an infusion of fraud is necessary 
to turn a flavor into a poison, Justice Holmes asserted in International News Service v. 
Associated Press, “the dose seems to me strong enough here to need a remedy from the 
law.”  248 U.S. 215, 247–48 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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